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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many private clubs in America today where members are
free both to recommend for membership those people with whom they
would like to associate, and to blackball those with whom they would
prefer not to associate.' As a consequence, private clubs often choose
new members based upon the desire to socialize with people of like
background, education, and stature within a community. Historically,
the American country club has been one of the least diverse American
institutions by design.' For the most part, the country club was created
by wealthy, white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) "between 1880
and 1930, when economic, racial, cultural and ethnic lines divided the
United States... into 'us' and 'them.' '1 This division was never more
Professor of Legal Writing, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Ken-
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expressed herein are those of the author and not those of the Kentucky Commission
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1. See Tracy Everbach & Mark Wrolstad, Most-Elite Country Clubs Haven't Ad-
mitted Blacks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 22, 1997, at lA. "The vote on new mem-
bers [at many exclusive clubs] must be virtually unanimous because . .. [a] handful
of members" have veto power which can prevent membership. Id. Furthermore, a
dissenter is not required to provide any reason for excluding an individual from a
club. See id.
2. See Frank Whelan, Few Minorities at Country Clubs, ALLENTOWN MORNING
CALL, June 5, 1997, at DI.
3. See id. Reportedly, President Kennedy was once challenged by his Secretary of
Labor, future Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, for his membership in the
Links Country Club because it excluded Jews, whereupon President Kennedy suppos-
edly replied with a chuckle, "Hell, Arthur, they don't even allow Catholics." See id.
prevalent than on the country club golf course.4 By 1900, more than
1000 golf courses operated in the United States, and whatever status
the game of golf had attained, derived from its association with the
wealthy who loved the game and were in a position to hire the best golf
course designers and develop the most exclusive clubs.5 In many cases,
as a result of the prevailing policy of exclusion, those excluded from
the upper-tier of country clubs opted to establish their own country
clubs to exclude people with whom they did not want to associate.6
For example, when the wealthy Irish and German Jewish Americans
were denied membership to a "WASP-only country club," they formed
their own country club and excluded Italians and African Americans.7
Although the historic division at country clubs has been made primar-
ily on the bases of race and national origin, gender has served as an
additional basis for division.8 Even when admitted to country club
membership, clubs have traditionally denied women the same benefits
of membership that have been and continue to be extended to male
members.9 Although some clubs have restructured their policies to ac-
commodate female members, "'[t]hat doesn't mean ... that she gets to
play on Saturday morning."" While clubs typically reserve Tuesdays
for women, with men and women sharing tee times during the remain-
der of the week, clubs typically reserve Saturdays for men, who pre-
sumably maintain work schedules that do not permit them to play dur-
ing the week, unlike their wives." For many years, generally accepted
practices included providing fewer benefits and less access for women
because wives were aware that their husbands worked during the
week. 2
However, times have changed. "A new generation of golfers now is
making its way onto the country club scene, career women who (luring
the week work just as hard as their male counterparts. And those wom-
en expect to receive the same benefits and privileges that dues-paying
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Tim Stephens, Women Golfers Slowly But Surely Chip at Barriers, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 18, 1996, at 10B (discussing the recent trend of prestigious
country clubs allowing female membership).
9. See id. (noting that women have been disadvantaged in such areas as voting
privileges, survivorship rights, and priority tee times).
10. See id. (quoting Marcia Chambers, a contributing editor for Golf Digest and au-
thor of THE UNPLAYABLE LIE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WOMEN AND DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICAN GOLF (1995)).
11. See id.
12. See id.
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men enjoy."3 Despite this change in our modem culture, division and
exclusion are still the norm at many country clubs throughout the na-
tion.14 Because private clubs are exempt from the public accommoda-
tions provisions of the Civil Rights Laws,'" that division is allowed to
continue and flourish in America today.
At a time when the President of the United States is calling for a
meaningful conversation on the country's race relations, 7 affirmative
action is under attack," and minorities and women are attempting to
reach the upper echelon of the business world, the denial of access to
private clubs has become increasingly detrimental to affected individu-
als.'9 Moreover, the blatant and free exclusion of these otherwise pro-
tected groups of persons "is detrimental to the goal of removing racial
discrimination from society."2" Private club membership "can be an
important source of business opportunity" because it potentially pro-
vides for "developing new contacts, expanding networks, and gaining
new clients."2' In a number of small communities, private clubs may
monopolize certain types of recreational facilities, from which other-
wise protected classes of persons are excluded.22 Furthermore, dis-
criminatory membership policies have had the effect of relegating wom-
13. Id.
14. See Everbach & Wrolstad, supra note 1, at 1A. Partly because of the efforts of
the Professional Golf Association (PGA), African Americans have made progress in
the fight against discriminatory membership policies. See id. In 1990, a country club
founder in Shoal Creek, Alabama, precluded the admission of African Americans as
members. See id. In response, the PGA required clubs hosting PGA-sanctioned events
to "demonstrably open their membership practices by 1995." See id. Furthermore, the
United States Golf Association (USGA), which hosts the U.S. Open tournaments for
both men and women, has adopted a similar antidiscrimination policy. See id.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1994).
16. See Everbach & Wrolstad, supra note 1, at 1A.
17. See Clinton Urges Nation to Mend Race Relations, BUFFALO NEWS, June 15,
1997, at Al (stating that '[w]e have torn down the barriers in our laws' . . . 'Now we
must breakdown the barriers in our lives, our minds and our hearts').
18. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourteenth Chronicle: American Apocalypse, 32
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1997) (discussing the means by which affirmative
action is being opposed).
19. See infra note 253 (discussing the underrepresentation of women and minori-
ties in executive-level positions).
20. See Cynthia A. Leiferman, Comment, Private Clubs: A Sanctuary For Discrimi-
nation?, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 71, 95 (1988).
21. See Thomas H. Sawyer, Private Golf Clubs: Freedom of Expression and the
Right to Privacy, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 187, 203 (1993).
22. See id.
en and minorities to a social status that "bears no relation to their ac-
tual abilities." 3
The costs of preserving and protecting the practice of discrimination
in private clubs are significant.24 First, discrimination perpetuates the
"all white male private club," thus "signal[ing] to other members of the
white male 'good ol' boy' network that deliberate discrimination has not
yet become discredited enough to express proudly and openly."' * Sec-
ond, discrimination implies that both our government and judicial sys-
tem approve of inequality among WASPs and such groups as African
Americans, Jews, and women.26 Finally, perhaps the most devastating
effects are the stigma of inferiority and psychological harm that private
acts of discrimination cause.27
Although the issue of private club membership has been raised over
the years, the issue may be gaining new vitality with the professional
success and celebrity of a young multiracial golfer named Tiger Woods,
who continues to win tournaments held at some clubs which, years
earlier, would allow him to do no more than caddie for another golf-
er.28 Although Woods reportedly declined the position of champion for
the cause of eliminating discriminatory practices at private clubs,29 his
success has already begun to serve as a catalyst for change.'
23. See Beth H. Parker, Membership Has Its Privileges: Defiant Private Clubs Are
Testing The Boundaries of Associational Rights, CAL. LAW., June 1988, at 46, 115.
24. See Sawyer, supra note 21, at 202-04. See generally Edith M. Hofmeister, Com-
ment, Women Need Not Apply: Discrimination and the Supreme Court's Intimate
Association Test, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 1009 (1994) (discussing the United States Supreme
Court's application of an "intimate association" standard to gender discrimination in
private clubs and its detrimental impact on women).
25. Sawyer, supra note 21, at 202-03.
26. See id. at 203.
27. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173-75 (1976) (holding that federal civil
rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits a private school from denying admission to
an African American solely on the basis of race); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 446-47 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the effects of racial dis-
crimination on African Americans).
28. See Whelan, supra note 2, at Dl. The young Masters champion reportedly in-
formed television talk show host Oprah Winfrey of his belief that some country clubs
continue to practice discrimination and stated, "I've had to deal with that growing up
.... I got kicked off of golf courses numerous times; been called some pretty tough
words to my face." Id.
29. See Lynn Zinser, Sexist Club a Knock on Woods, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6, 1997,
at Cl. Woods reportedly responded to criticism regarding his coach's affiliation with
an all-male club by saying, 'I can't be a champion to all causes.' See id.; but see
Sportscene, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 10, 1997, at D2 (explaining that Woods has a
"stated goal to help eliminate discrimination in golf' but suggesting that perhaps
Woods's goal extends only to racial discrimination).
30. See Everbach & Wrolstad, supra note 1, at IA. Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk recently
discussed Woods's success and focused attention on the issue of private clubs' dis-
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This Article will attempt to capitalize upon the renewed attention
paid to the issue of the membership practices of some private clubs
today and will argue that the time has come to abolish such forms of
blatant discrimination through the following: (1) broad judicial interpre-
tation of the Civil Rights Laws and a narrow interpretation of any ex-
emptions contained therein;"' (2) state legislation affording all protect-
ed classifications of persons access to opportunities without any ex-
emption for private clubs;' (3) the denial of any government benefits
or privileges to private clubs that discriminate;' and (4) political and
social pressures against discrimination.' This Article will provide an
overview of the federal law most frequently invoked in civil rights cases
involving private club membership practices,' the Public Accommoda-
tions provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,36 and some
state laws which provide recourse to women and minorities excluded
from private club membership." It will discuss the balance courts have
attempted to strike between clubs' and members' First Amendment
right of association and the goal of eliminating discrimination through a
judicially-created definition of "private club." ' Finally, this Article will
conclude that even if a particular club fits the definition of a distinctly
crimination by refusing to visit clubs that adhered to race-based exclusionary policies.
See id. Mayor Kirk refused to attend events held at several Dallas country clubs "be-
cause of their exclusionary policies, which he called offensive, stupid and embarrass-
ing." See id. Woods was again "drawn into the tricky confluence where golf meets
discrimination" when Houston's all-male Lochinvar Golf Club denied a female CNN
producer access to the club to discuss with Woods the mechanics of his golf swing.
See David Barron, Club's Discriminatory Policy Puts Tiger in Middle Again, HouS-
TON CHRON., May 26, 1997, at 12.
31. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text (discussing judicial intervention
and interpretation as a means to curtail private discrimination).
32. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text (discussing state legislation as
a means to address private discrimination).
33. See infra notes 204-31 and accompanying text (advocating denial of liquor li-
censes and tax exemptions from private clubs found to enforce discriminatory poli-
cies).
34. See infra notes 232-51 and accompanying text (discussing the application of so-
cial and political pressures as a means to alleviate private discrimination).
35. See infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text (discussing federal civil rights
laws).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
37. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text (discussing state and local
legislation).
38. See infra notes 122-78 and accompanying text (discussing the judicially-created
definition of "private club").
private club, and is therefore exempt from the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the government should require such a club to surrender its tax-exempt
status and certain public benefits and privileges. 9 Otherwise, individu-
als who are excluded from private clubs, along with fellow taxpayers in
general, would be asked to support clubs which discriminate, including
those from which they were originally excluded.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVATE CLUBS WITHIN LIMITED
BOUNDARIES
A close review of the United States Constitution reveals that it should
afford few protections to private clubs today, particularly country clubs
and organizations devoted to social or recreational pursuits such as
playing golf. As previously discussed, it is often difficult to distinguish
between a purely social function and an economic activity.4" Many
sports and social activities held at country clubs provide economic op-
portunities for concessionaires and the clubs themselves, at the very
least, offer valuable networking activities by providing opportunities for
members to mix business with pleasure." Courts have recognized an
inherent conflict between legislative efforts to eliminate discrimination
against citizens and the First Amendment "freedom of association" of
the members of a private organization.42 Additionally, courts have ad-
dressed the constitutionally protected freedom of association in two
distinct senses: intimate association and expressive association."
The United States Supreme Court defines intimate association as
those "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal as-
pects of one's life."44 The Supreme Court has traditionally limited these
constitutionally-protected intimate associations to those arising from
the core concept of family.4" Likewise, intimate associations afforded
39. See infra notes 179-231 and accompanying text (discussing methods for chip-
ping away at country club discrimination).
40. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
42. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
43. See id. at 617-18.
44. See id. at 620.
45. See id. at 618-19; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-F4 (1978)
(protecting personal affiliations that attend the creation and sustenance of a family
and marriage); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 855-56 (1977) (protecting decisions regarding raising of children); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-90 (1977) (protecting woman's right to abor-
tion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (protecting right
to cohabitation with one's relatives).
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First Amendment protections are generally characterized by "relative
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and main-
tain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship."46 On the other hand, a relationship lacking the foregoing
qualities appears to be too remote from the privacy concerns which the
Court has accorded constitutional protection under the First Amend-
ment right of association.4"
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees," the Supreme Court recognized
that there is a diverse range of human relationships that may claim
constitutional freedom of association rights.4" To address such diversi-
ty, a court must make a "careful assessment" on a case-by-case basis as
to where a particular "relationship's objective characteristics locate it
on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of person-
al attachments.""° Relevant factors in conducting the foregoing assess-
ment include the size, purpose, policies, selectivity, and congeniality of
the relationship. Applying these factors in Roberts, the Supreme
Court upheld the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which forbids gender
discrimination in "places of public accommodation," against a freedom
of association challenge by determining that the Jaycees was not a
private club.52 In particular, the Court noted that the local Jaycees had
never denied membership to an applicant on any basis other than sex
or age, and, therefore, had "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness." 3
46. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
47. See id.
48. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 618 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 625, 630-31. The Minnesota Department of Human Rights used the
Act to find a violation of the state's public accommodations law and ordered that
women be admitted. See id. at 615. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides, in
relevant part: "It is an unfair discriminatory practice: to deny any person the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion,
disability, national origin .... or sex." MINN. STAT. § 363.03 subd. 3(a)(1) (1991).
53. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621; see also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 236 (1969) (discussing housing discrimination); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,
302 (1969) (discussing discrimination at an amusement park); cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973) (holding that an organization
whose only selection criterion is race has "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that
might make it a private club exempt from the federal civil rights statute).
Moreover, women were permitted to attend certain meetings and partic-
ipate in particular projects and social functions.' The Court deter-
mined that the local chapters of the Jaycees were "neither small nor
selective" and noted that "much of the activity central to the formation
and maintenance of the association involve[d] the participation of
strangers."5
The second type of associational right protected under the Constitu-
tion is the right of expressive association.56 The Supreme Court defines
expressive association "as the right to associate with others in pursuit
of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends."57 In Roberts, for example, the Court stated that
"[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the gov-
ernment for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed."' The Court
recognized that "[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into
the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire."59 Although
that was precisely the effect of the Minnesota Human Rights Act as
discussed in Roberts,0 the Court noted that the constitutional right of
association is not absolute." Rather, it is balanced against compelling
state interests in eradicating discrimination.
If the state's interest "cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms," the balance tips in favor of
54. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
55. Id.; see also Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 54647 (1987) (holding that California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, requiring all "busi-
ness establishments" to admit women, did not violate the First Amendment right to
intimate association because of the business-like attributes of Rotary, including the
fact that each chapter had 20 to 900 members, and because many activities of the
local clubs were carried on in the presence of strangers).
56. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
57. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 23, at 50.
58. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
59. Id. at 623. Other examples of government action which may infringe upon the
freedom of expressive association include "impos[ing] penalties or withhold[ing] bene-
fits from individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group" and requir-
ing disclosure of membership rosters. See Brown v. Socialist Workers' 74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982) (holding compelled disclosure of campaign contribu-
tions to the Socialist Party unconstitutional); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181. (1972)
(holding that college could not deny official recognition of student political group
based on disagreement with group's philosophy).
60. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
61. See id. at 623.
62. See id.
[Vol. 25: 495, 1998] Discrimination at the Country Club
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
enforcing the antidiscrimination law.' In holding that Minnesota's
compelling state interest justified the infringement upon the
associational rights held by the Jaycees, the Court stated:
[D]iscrinination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative
needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical
notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both de-
prives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life.'
Noting the state's "broad authority to create rights of public access on
behalf of its citizens," the Court upheld the Minnesota public accommo-
dation law.' In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that the Jay-
cees afforded its members "public accommodations" in the form of lead-
ership skills, business contacts, and employment opportunities.6
It is clear that First Amendment rights will give way when a purported-
ly private club conducts a significant amount of commerce. Such clubs
are "'commercial' in nature 'where business deals are often made and
personal contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and pro-
fessional advancement are formed.'
67
63. See id.
64. Id. at 625 (citing Heckler v. Mathes, 465 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1984); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (plurality opinion)).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 625-26 (citing United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772(Minn. 1981)).
67. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988)
(citation omitted). In New York State Club Ass'n, the Court upheld a city ordinance
that prohibits discrimination in
any "institution, club or place of accommodation [that] has more than four
hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives pay-
ment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of
trade or business."
Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)) (alteration in original); see
Diane S. Worth & Nancy M. Landis, Does Membership Have Its Privileges? The Lim-
its on Permissible Discrimination in Private Clubs, 60 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 27, 31
(1991) (discussing the implication of discriminatory club practices on the right to
make contracts).
III. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AFFECTING PRIVATE CLUBS
A. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982:' Equality in Contractual and
Property Rights
The Civil Rights Act of 1866,69 which abolished slavery and attempted
to abolish all remaining badges of slavery, was codified in §§ 19810-
1982' of the United States Code and proscribes private acts of racial
discrimination.72 Section 1981 ensures non-white citizens the same right
to "make and enforce contracts" as white citizens,73 and § 1982 prohibits
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property. '4 Both sections
have limited utility in eradicating discrimination in the membership of
private clubs because membership in a private club ordinarily does not
involve property or contract rights. However, in limited circumstances,
the Supreme Court has held that private club memberships can be so
closely associated with the sale or lease of property as to become "part
of that property."75
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983:76 Equal Protection Under Color of State Law
Section 1983 prohibits anyone acting under color of state law from
denying equal protection to any individual.7 7 Section 1983's utility in
eradicating discriminatory membership practices of private clubs is also
limited because the practices of the club must involve some state action
in order to be actionable." Thus far, courts have taken a narrow view
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1994).
69. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), reenacted as Act of May 31, 1870, Ch. 114,
§ 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
71. 1d. § 1982.
72. See generally i d. §§ 1981-1982.
73. See id. § 1981.
74. See id. § 1982.
75. See Tillnan v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973) (find-
ing that a recreational association's discriminatory membership policy violated § 1982
because membership created a valuable property right); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Ic., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969) (holding that a "leasehold of realty coupled with
membership share in a nonprofit company organized to offer recreational facilities to
owners and lessees of real property constituted property under § 1982"); see also
Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 315-16 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing TiUman in
finding that membership in club tied to home ownership establishes "property
rights"); Durham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 961
(W.D. Tex. 1987) (applying Sullivan in holding that use of a specific plot of land
owned by club constituted "property").
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
77. See id,
78. See id.
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of what constitutes state action in connection with private clubs. For
example, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,9 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that merely issuing a state liquor license and regulations of the
state liquor control board does not "sufficiently implicate the state" in
the discriminatory policies of a private club to constitute state action."
While conceding that private clubs have a right to choose their members
by adhering to discriminatory policies, the litigant in Irvis argued that
the state's issuance of a liquor license constituted state action for pur-
poses of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The Court held that it is not enough that a private club receives some
benefit or service from the state for purposes of § 1983 liability.' Nor is
state regulation sufficient.' Therefore, § 1983 is of very limited utility in
eliminating deliberate discrimination by private clubs.
C. Title IX.:' Equal Opportunity in Education
As discussed below, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
certain forms of discrimination in private associations or organiza-
tions.' However, the public accommodations provisions provide no
remedy for gender discrimination; thus, women excluded from certain
clubs must turn to other avenues to access networking opportunities.'
In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments which
is designed to assure equal opportunity to women in education, including
sports activities.87 Noting the absence of protections afforded to women
by other civil rights laws, one commentator has stated that "Title IX
79. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
80. See id. at 175-77. But see Citizen's Council on Human Relations v. Buffalo
Yacht Club, 438 F. Supp. 316, 323-24 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding state action where
yacht club was located on land leased from the City of Buffalo adjacent to a public
park); Frank v. Ivy Club, 576 A.2d 241, 257 (N.J. 1990) (holding that when a state
university "and an organization that deems itself private share a symbiotic relation-
ship, particularly where the allegedly 'private' entity supplies an essential service
which is not provided by the [university], the servicing entity loses its private charac-
ter and becomes subject to the laws against discrimination").
81. See Irvis, 407 U.S. at 171.
82. See id. at 173.
83. See id.
84. Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
85. See infra notes 90-178 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibition of
discrimination in places of public accomodation).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1994).
87. See id.
stands alone at the Federal level to fight against gender dis-
crimination."' Because many private clubs permit local schools to use
their courses for sports activities and competition, the practice of private
clubs excluding women from their membership, admitting them as non-
voting members only, or denying them equal benefits is questionable.'
D. 42 U.S.C. .§ 2000a (Title II): Balancing First Amendment Rights
and Antidiscrimination Laws in Public Accommodations.
Because the issue of discrimination in private clubs rarely involves
protected property or contract rights or any state action,90 the public
accommodations law of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a
remedy to victims of discrimination by prohibiting discrimination or
segregation on the basis of race, religion, color, or national origin at
places of "public accommodation" that affect commerce.' On its face,
Title II is limited in scope because it prohibits only discrimination by
private individuals providing public accommodations that affect com-
merce.
.92
Most forms of racial and gender discrimination have been unlawful
since the enactment of a series of civil rights laws designed to eliminate
the badges of slavery that remained long after the Civil War. 3 Neverthe-
less, racial prejudice94 and the physical bondage still imposed upon per-
sons through denial of equal access to public accommodations remain
88. See Sawyer, supro note 21, at 199.
89. See id. at 198.
90. See supra, notes 69-83 and accompanying text (discussing the idea that discrim-
ination in private clubs rarely involves property or contract rights or state action).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation, . . . without discrimination or seg-
regation on the ground of race .... ).
92. See id.; see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 302 (1969).
93. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), reenacted as Act
of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870) (codified as amnended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 enforced the abolition of slavery, declar-
ing:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign pow-
er ... and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,... shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property,
as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Id.
94. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 260 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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the most prevalent remnants of slavery.95 Congress enacted Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eradicate racial prejudice and discrimna-
tion by private individuals in places of public accommodation.96 Al-
though the Act has been pivotal in providing a remedy for many egre-
gious forms of discrimination, it completely exempts bona fide private
clubs from its coverage.97 In addition to exempting private clubs, wom-
en excluded from private clubs or public accommodations will find no
remedy under Title II." Although the Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, or national origin by a place providing public ac-
commodations that affect commerce, it makes no mention of gender.'
By its statutory definition, a private club is discriminatory if its mem-
bership is inherently selective. ' Race discrimination in a club's mem-
bership practices is not unlawful, however, regardless of how blatant or
egregious it is, if a club is proven to be distinctly private under the
Act."' In essence, the Act gives truly private clubs a license to engage
in discrimination based upon race and gender. However, Title II does
provide an important remedy to many victims of discrimination as a
result of a club's exclusionary practices by broadly defining public ac-
commodation.'"
1. What is a Public Accommodation?
Under the Act, a place of "public accommodation" includes any place
or organization which falls under any one of the following categories:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to tran-
sient guests... ;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other fa-
95. See Lieferman, supra note 20, at 71 n.15 (explaining that the purpose of "Title
II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is to eliminate distinctions 'between those who have
and those who have not been slaves'").
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
97. See id. § 2000a(e).
98. See id. § 2000a.
99. See id.
100. See Leiferman, supra note 20, at 95.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994). The burden of proof is on the defendant to
show that it is a private club and not covered by the provisions of the civil rights
laws. See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that
defendant's cafe was not a private club under the Act); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F.
Supp. 1143, 1150 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (holding that defendant's club was not a private
club under the Act).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
cility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises... ;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other
place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment which.., is physically located within the premises of any
establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or ... within the premises of
which is physically located any such covered establishment, and ... which holds
itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment."
In addressing discrinination in private clubs, the category of the public
accommodation law of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 most frequently ap-
plied is that which relates to "places of exhibition or entertainment.""°
Because many private clubs provide sports activities, this provision has
been extremely helpful in reducing discrimination at some clubs which
initially appear to be private. The Supreme Court has held that "enter-
tainment" includes "direct participation in a sport as well as the viewing
of sports activities as a spectator."' 5 Moreover, an emphasis on the rec-
reational activities of an organization or association may result in a find-
ing that it is a "place of entertainment" for purposes of the public accom-
modation laws.
For example, in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America," the Boy Scouts of
America (Boy Scouts) excluded a seven-year-old boy when he refused to
profess his belief in God as required by the Boy Scouts' "Declaration of
Religious Principle."'0 7 The Boy Scouts argued that its organization was
not a place of "public accommodation" because its function was educa-
tion, not entertainment." However, the court rejected the argument
and determined that the Boy Scouts was indeed a place of "entertain-
ment" because of its emphasis on "fun" as outlined in its own literature.
Therefore, the Boy Scouts was deemed a place of public accommodation
subject to the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
Once it is determined that an organization, association, or physical
facility fits into one of the enumerated categories of § 2000a(b), it is easy
to satisfy the second prong of the test for finding a place of public ac-
commodation covered by the Act, which requires that the accommoda-
tion affect interstate commerce."" For example, one court determined
that a swim club affected interstate commerce when, among other fac-
tors, the club's sliding board was manufactured out-of-state and its out-
103. Id.
104. See id. § 2000a(b)(3).
105. See Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, '02 (E.D.
Va. 1983) (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1969)).
106. 742 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
107. See id. at 1422.
108. See id. at 1417-18.
109. See id.
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
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of-state guests were sources of entertainment which "moved in com-
merce.""' The commerce requirement was also easily satisfied in two
other situations: (1) when an ostensibly private club hosted an annual
golf tournament attended by out-of-state professionals and club mem-
bers,"' and (2) when a private club allowed an out-of-state golf team to
play on its golf course once a year."3 The statute itself plainly provides
that a place of entertainment affects commerce if "it customarily pres-
ents... athietic teams,. . . or other sources of entertainment which
"114move in commerce ....
2. The Private Club Exemption
Although Congress went to great lengths to broadly define the term
public accommodation, it provided a specific exemption from the Act's
coverage, stating that distinctly private clubs are not places of public ac-
commodation and are not covered under the Act."' Section 2000a(e) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other estab-
lishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of
such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an estab-
lishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section. "'
Conspicuously absent from the wording of the exemption is any defini-
tion of the term "private club."" 7 While the term private club is not spe-
cifically defined, the legislative history of the private club exemption
indicates that unlike the broadly enumerated categories of public accom-
modations,"8 determining whether a club is private is a fact-sensitive
inquiry."' Ostensibly private clubs "must be examined in the light of
the Act's clear purpose of protecting only 'the genuine privacy of private
clubs ... whose membership is genuinely selective .... """9 The "pur-
U11. See United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
112. See Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc. 573 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D.
Va. 1983).
113. See Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1994).
115. See id. § 2000a(e).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id. § 2000a(b).
119. See Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir. 1968) (finding that the YMCA
was not a private club).
120. Id. at 101-02 (quoting 100 CONG. REC. 13,697 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hubert
pose of Title II is 'to move the daily affront and humiliation involved in
discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the gener-
al public,'...."121
3. When is a Club Distinctly Private?
In narrowly construing the private club exemption, various courts have
emphasized a number of nonexclusive factors to determine whether a
particular organization, association, or physical facility is indeed a private
club, thereby exempt under the Act. 2 The following discusses some of
the factors most frequently weighed by the courts.
a. The "genuine selectivity of the group in the admission of
its members:'
23
Rather than focusing on the physical facility of an organization or
association, courts most frequently focus upon an organization's or
association's membership practices. 124 Courts have determined that the
key factor in determining whether an establishment is a private club is
whether the club's membership is truly selective.26 In analyzing wheth-
er a particular club is truly selective in its membership practices, courts
have looked at the "substantiality of the membership fee;"'26 the "nu-
Humphrey)).
121. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18
(1964)).
122. See infra notes 123-78 and accompanying text (discussing factors for determin-
ing whether a club is private).
123. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973); Durham
v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 960 (W.D. Tex. 1987);
Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 402-03 (E.D. Va.
1983); United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472 F. Supp. 1174,
1175-76 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Cornelius v. BPOE, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn.
1974); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375 (E.D. La. 1969)).
124. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(explaining that "place" is a term of convenience, not limitation).
125. See Tillman, 410 U.S. at 438; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236 (1969); see also Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at 1425; Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F.
Supp. at 797-802; Brown, 573 F. Supp. at 403; Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F.
Supp. 378, 382, rev'd, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970). During the floor debate regarding § 2000a(e), Senator
Hubert Humphrey asserted, "[w]e intend only to protect the genuine privacy of pri-
vate clubs or other establishment whose membership is genuinely selective on some
reasonable basis." 110 CONG. REc. 13,697 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hubert Humphrey).
126. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 797 (citing Brown, 573 F. Supp. at
403).
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merical limit on club membership;"'27 the "membership's control over
the selection of new members;"'28 the "formality of the club's admission
procedures;"'29 the "standards or criteria for admission;"130 and
"whether and how many white applicants have been denied membership
relative to the total number of white applicants."''
No single factor in analyzing the issue of selectivity is dispositive. For
example, in United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club,32 the court held
that a swim club's membership selection process was not "genuinely
selective," and, therefore, not exempt from the public accommodations
provision, even though it undisputedly required substantial membership
fees, 1" placed a limit on the number of shareholder members,'" and
utilized a formal admission procedure which was controlled by the share-
holders.'35 In determining that the club was not genuinely selective, the
court was most persuaded by the fact that the club conducted no back-
ground investigation of the character or financial status of applicants and
did not require that applicants reside in a particular geographic area.'
127. See id. (citing Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375).
128. See id. (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at
375).
129. See id. (citing Brown, 573 F. Supp. at 403).
130. See id. (citing Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968); Cork Club,
315 F. Supp. at 1151).
131. See id. at 797-98 (citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S.
431, 438 (1973); Wright v. Salisbury Club Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1980); Dur-
ham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 960 (W.D. Tex.
1987); New York v. Ocean Club, 602 F. Supp. 489, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Brown, 573 F.
Supp. at 403; United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472 F. Supp.
1174, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375).
132. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 798.
133. See id. at 798 (holding that charges of $250 for a capital share or bond plus
$32 annual dues for up to three family members and $14 for each additional member
were insufficient); see also Tillman, 410 U.S. at 433 & n.2 (holding that $375 in mem-
bership dues was insufficient); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333,
1335 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that $2000 in dues was insufficient); Brown, 573 F.
Supp. at 400, 403 (holding $750 in dues insufficient).
134. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 797 (holding that a limit of 500
shareholders was insufficient); see also Tillman, 410 U.S. at 433 (holding that 325
members was insufficient to show selectivity); Brown, 573 F. Supp. at 400 (holding
that 450 members was insufficient to demonstrate selectivity).
135. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 800; accord Salisbury Club, 632
F.2d at 312; Ocean Club, 602 F. Supp. at 495; see also Tillman, 410 U.S. at 433, 438
(holding that a requirement of recommendations was insufficient to demonstrate se-
lectivity).
136. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 798-99.
"If there is no established criteria for selecting members, the courts are
reluctant to accept the claim of private status . . . . " However,
"'[w]here there is a... policy of admission without any kind of investiga-
tion of the applicant, the logical conclusion is that membership is not
selective.""' Concluding that the swim club was not private the court
noted that over a period of approximately thirty years, the club had ad-
mitted at least 1400 shareholder member families in addition to many
associate families.' In its thirty-year history, only three non-black fami-
lies had been denied membership by the club. 4 '
b. The "membership's control over the operations of
the establishment:
'141
By its very nature, if a club is private, only its members have the au-
thority to determine how it is organized, operated, and maintained. If the
membership loses that control by allowing public access, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the club is no longer private.'42 For example, in
Durham v. Red Lake Fishing and Hunting Club, Inc.," the court de-
termined that the members of a fishing and hunting club had little con-
trol over the operations of their establishment because the roads running
over the club's property were open to the public and were maintained by
the county.'"
137. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (citation omit-
ted).
138. Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968) (quoting Note, 62 Nw. U. L.
REv. 244, 247 & n.21 (1967)).
139. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 799.
140. See id. at 800 (citing Tillman, 410 U.S. at 438 (stating "only one white appli-
cant rejected in eleven years"); Salisbury Club, 632 F.2d at 312 (noting "no white
residents rejected and only three white nonresidents rejected"); Nesmith, 397 F.2d at
101 (stating that "over 99% of white applicants accepted"); Durham v. Red Lake Fish-
ing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954, 956 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (finding "only two
whites rejected in fifty years"); Ocean Club, 602 F. Supp. at 495 (finding "100 applica-
tions and no rejections"); United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472
F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (stating that "within one-year period, only three
rejections out of 1,011 applications").
141. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 796 (citing Durham, 666 F. Supp. at
960; United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (E.D. La. 1969)).
142. See id. at 796-802.
143. 666 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
144. See id. at 960.
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c. The history"' and purpose of the organization:1 .
The central inquiry concerning the history and purpose of the organiza-
tion, and its bearing upon whether a club is genuinely private, is "wheth-
er [the club] was created to avoid the effect of civil rights legisla-
tion." 47 As is the case with many other types of discrimination, it is
doubtful that a club would be so blatant as to state such a purpose in its
by-laws or other written documents. However, it could be relevant that a
private club becomes more selective after the adoption of civil rights
legislation" or if a change in membership procedures occurs after a
victim of discrimination files a complaint with an enforcement agen-
cy."'' The club's history may also indicate whether the club was de-
signed to be selective in its membership, which is central to the private
club inquiry."
d. The use of the facilities by nonmembers:151
Public use is directly contradictory to the true character of a private
club. 2 When a club permits regular use by nonmembers, it loses its
private club status and is subject to discrimination laws."' In
Lansdowne Swim Club," the court held that the regular use of the
swim club by nonmembers was inconsistent with the club's "purported
desire to be exclusive""' and undercut its claim that it was a private
club. "' 6 The court noted that, for a fee, members and associates could
145. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 797 (citing Eagles, 472 F. Supp. at
1175).
146. See id. (citing Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376); see also New York v. Ocean Club,
602 F. Supp. 489, 494-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
147. See Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 802 (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S.
298, 301-02 (1969); Eagles, 472 F. Supp. at 1175).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. (footnote omitted) (stating that "the origins of [Lansdowne Swim Club]
suggest that it was intended to serve as a 'community pool' for families in the area
and not as a private club").
151. See id. at 797.
152. See id. at 803-04; Durham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F.
Supp. 954, 960 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (holding private status lost when club opened its
roads to the public).
153. See Durham, 666 F. Supp. at 960.
154. 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
155. See id. at 804.
156. See id. at 803-04.
bring as many guests into the pool area as they liked, and members'
house guests could purchase temporary memberships of their own."n' In
addition, the club hosted two or three swim meets per year which were
open to the general public.1  Each year, the club sold "splash" party
tickets to the general public, the local Boys' Club utilized the swim club's
parking lot to sell Christmas trees, and a basketball and volleyball court
on the lot were open to the public.'59
Similarly, in New York v. Ocean Club,"° the court held that the club
was a public accommodation and, therefore, not entitled to the private
club exemption because, in addition to non-selectivity of membership
and lack of control, the club advertised and allowed the public to use its
tennis courts."'
e. "Whether the club advertises for members:""2
Advertising to increase usage of club facilities is inconsistent with
private club status."1 In Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd.," the Fourth
Circuit held that a subdivision country club was not entitled to the pri-
vate club exemption from the civil rights laws because the club publicly
advertised by circulating a newsletter to subdivision residents soliciting
their membership in the club.'65 The newsletter was entitled "Notice to
All Salisbury Residents" and "invited the readers to 'take advantage of a
great opportunity' in the form of reduced initiation fees during a mem-
bership drive."" In addition, the club participated in a hospitality pro-
gram for new subdivision residents and distributed club application
forms to real estate agents. The developer of the club and subdivision
157. See id. at 803.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 803-04.
160. 602 F. Supp. 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
161. See id. at 494-96.
162. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp at 797 (citing Wright v. Salisbury Club,
Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order
of Eagles, 472 F. Supp. 1174, 1175 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Cornelius v. BPOE, 382 F. Supp.
1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (S.D. Tex.
1970)).
163. See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1152; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 172 n.10 (1976); United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 93
(E.D. La. 1967) (holding that the club was not private because advertisements invited
the public); Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 144 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750-51 (Sup. Ct.
1955) (holding that the club was not private when listed in telephone directory under
"Bathing Beaches-Public" instead of under "Clubs"), modified on other grounds, 150
N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956), offd, 142 N.E.2d 186 (N.Y. 1957).
164. 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
165. See id. at 312-13.
166. Id. at 312.
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also advertised club membership as one of the attractions of living in the
subdivision.'67 The court held that the Salisbury Club's recruitment ac-
tivities were not those of a truly private club."
f "Whether the club is profit or nonprofit:"'169
In determining whether a club is truly private, and therefore exempt
from the antidiscrimination provisions of civil rights laws, a court will
further consider the club's profit or nonprofit status.1 7 Courts have
been most willing to protect the privacy and associational interests of
club members when a club's purpose is fraternal or social and that pur-
pose cannot be maintained without selective membership.' 71 On the
other hand, if the purpose of the club is economic opportunity, the club's
privacy is not entitled to protection or an exemption. "[C]lubs must
function as extensions of members' homes and not as extensions of their
businesses," because "[r]acial prejudice will not be permitted to infect
channels of commerce under the guise of 'privacy.'"'7 3
g. The 'formalities observed by the club," including the bylaws,
meetings, and membership cards:"7 4
Although not a dispositive factor, the court will consider whether the
club has articles or bylaws, formal expulsion and admission procedures,
a membership roster, and membership cards.'7 1 Moreover, it is impor-
tant to examine whether the club holds' formal meetings in which its
members have a voice in the policies and activities of the club. A
167. See id.
168. See id. at 313.
169. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 797 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); Cornelius v. BPOE, 382 F. Supp.
1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974)).
170. See id.
171. See United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 376 (E.D. La. 1969).
172. See Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1204.
173. Id. at 1204.
174. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 797 (citing Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d
96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968); Durham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F.
Supp. 954, 960 (W.D. Tex. 1987); Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376).
175. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376; Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152
(S.D. Tex. 1970) ("[No] matter how elaborate the organization and well defined the
by-laws, if they are ignored in practice, they are of little value.")
176. See Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. at 1152.
voice is an indication of membership control, vital to private club sta-
tus.'77 At least one court has held that a club simply cannot be a "pri-
vate association" if "'the members do not meet together.""7
IV. CHIPPING AWAY AT DISCRIMINATION AT THE COUNTRY CLUB
Despite the fact that the public accommodations provisions of Title II
have been in effect for over thirty years,'79 discrimination still -prevails
in one of its most blatant forms at some clubs-exclusion from mem-
bership on the basis of race, gender, national origin, or religion-because
private clubs are excluded from its coverage. 8 It is time to reconsider
the issue of private club discrimination.' and develop ways to elimi-
nate the last bastion of legal segregation in our society. This section
discusses actions that some professionals, organizations, and individuals
have recently taken in eradicating discrimination in many private clubs
and suggests areas where these efforts could be expanded.
A. Judicial Intervention and Interpretation: A Bright Line Test
If the First Amendment freedom of association is invoked to protect
truly intimate or expressive associations, and if courts broadly construe
both the public accommodations provisions of Title II and the private
club exemption, it is doubtful that most country clubs could be classified
as distinctly private and thus immune from liability for discriminatory
membership practices. The First Amendment would not immunize coun-
try clubs because membership relationships therein are far from the
intimate familial relationships protected by the right of privacy.'82 The
courts have noted that there are no intimate associational rights attached
to members of a club playing golf together."" The purpose of many
177. See id. (quoting Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102) (explaining, however, that this fac-
tor is not necessarily dispositive).
178. See Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102 (quoting Robert L. Thompson, Comment, Civil
Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private Club Exemption, 45 N.C. L.
REV. 498, 505 (1967)).
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) (effective July 2, 1964).
180. See id. § 2000a(e).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14 (discussing the continued prevalence
of discrimination in country clubs).
182. See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546
(1987) (holding that the "relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of
intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection"); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-21 (1984) (stating that "intimate human relationships
must be secured against undue intrusion by the State" to preserve personal liberty).
183. See State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 378-81 (Md. 1989) (holding
that a golf club was not protected by First Amendment freedom of association de-
spite its selective membership criteria and fraternal atmosphere); see also New York
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clubs is simply to provide entertainment and recreation for their mem-
bers and, therefore, should not qualify for the First Amendment
protections afforded intimate associational rights."
The second category of protected associational rights deals with the
free expression of ideas, the application of which should not qualify
country clubs for such protections. In Roberts, the Supreme Court out-
lined the limited scope of expressive associational rights in stating that
"[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the gov-
ernment for the redress of [private] grievances [can]not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.""u
This second category of associational rights, which protects the free
expression of political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultur-
al ideas to preserve liberty," is not as compelling as the state's interest
in eradicating blatant discrimination against otherwise protected persons
in the case of private clubs. 7
Many clubs, particularly country clubs with elegant sports and social
facilities, are places of public accommodation under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 19 6 4 "M because they are "place[s] of exhibition or enter-
tainment" whose "operations affect commerce. " "s9 Such clubs common-
ly host professional golf tournaments, high school and collegiate sporting
events, wedding receptions, professional luncheons, and other semi-pri-
vate events which subsidize and financially support club events and facil-
ities. A narrow construction of the private club exemption and the fac-
tors weighed by the courts in making the determination of whether a
club is private would likely preclude most country clubs from gaining
immunity from the antidiscrimination provisions of civil rights laws.
Clubs that are used in furtherance of any business opportunities should
be classified as public, not private accommodations."w Defining private
club narrowly will also force the majority of clubs that fail to meet the
strict definition to abide by the nondiscrimination provisions for public
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1988) (holding that drinking,
socializing, and playing golf at a club do not support a First Amendment right).
184. See New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 10-14.
185. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
186. See id.
187. See Leiferman, supra note 20, at 112.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994).
189. See id.; see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1969).
190. See Sawyer, supra note 21, at 188.
accommodations and would finally eliminate the last stronghold of legal
segregation. 1'.
B. State and Local Legislation: A Price for Club Membership
The assessment of "what, is a private club" has often been a difficult
one for courts because of the tension between possible First Amendment
associational rights and enforcement of civil rights laws. The clubs assert
their right to make their own rules relating to club membership and priv-
ileges, while the government is obligated to prevent discriminatory con-
duct. In construing the private club exemption, courts have been engaged
in a highly complex balancing act. Many state and local governments
have taken a much clearer approach to the fight against dis-
crimination."9
In order to eradicate discrimination, a state may choose to broaden the
definition of a public accommodation and expand the application of the
state's civil rights law. For instance, in 1991, the Kansas legislature
amended the "Kansas Act Against Discrimination""3 to provide that
"nonprofit recreational or social association[s]" are automatically nonex-
empt and prohibited from discriminating in regard to membership if they
have over 100 members, provide regular meal service, and "receive pay-
ment for dues, fees, use of space, use of facility, services, meals or bev-
erages, directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of nonmembers."'94 The
Act provides a narrow exemption for any "religious or private fraternal
and benevolent association or corporation."195
Rather than trying to determine which clubs are distinctly private,
many states simply withhold "government-regulated privileges, such as
property tax benefits, liquor licenses, and environmental permits," from
clubs that discriminate."6 These state actions have been constitutional-
ly upheld, as the courts have recognized that associational rights, even
when they exist, do not wholly remove the right of the state to regulate
191. Some commentators have suggested that the freedom of association, coupled
with a limited right to discriminate in order to effectuate that right, should be con-
fined to situations in which it is necessary to preserve the purpose and nature of the
club. See Marc Rohr, Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Consti-
tutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460, 469-70 (1970); Note, Developing Legal
Vistas for the Discouragement of Private Club Discrimination, 58 IOWA L. REV. 108,
136-41 (1972); see also Sawyer, supra note 21, at 206-07.
192. See infra notes 193-231 and accompanying text (discussing state and local
approaches to eliminating discrimination).
193. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (1993).
194. Id. § 44-1002(i)(2).
195. See id.; Worth & Landis, supra note 67, at 35.
196. See Sawyer, supra note 21, at 212-13; infra notes 204-31 and accompanying
text.
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private clubs. 97 The right to associate for expressive purposes is bal-
anced against compelling state interests which justify regulations infring-
ing upon First Amendment rights.' Clearly, the states have a compel-
ling interest in eradicating discrimination.' Accordingly, many states
have now adopted laws to assure women and minorities equal access to
club membership, as well as benefits such as equal tee times, access to
club rooms, and voting rights.2" Such government intervention in the
fight against discrimination is appealing from both moral and political
standpoints. As Justice Brennan has stated, "Government is the social
organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, jus-
tice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals
for social conduct.""' Moreover, it seems inherently unfair to provide
state benefits and privileges to clubs that discriminate in their member-
ship policies and practices, particularly because it is often at the expense
of other taxpayers who would not condone such discriminatory policies.
While government has not literally involved itself in racial or gender
discrimination by providing tax exemptions 2 or liquor licenses2" to
private clubs, the elimination of certain benefits and privileges provided
by the state would serve as a great incentive for clubs to adopt nondis-
criminatory policies and practices.
1. Liquor Licenses
The price for clubs with discriminatory policies or practices in many
states is that the members of such clubs must unwillingly become teeto-
talers. Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, and
New Jersey are a few of the states that will confiscate liquor licenses
197. See Sawyer, supra note 21, at 212-13; infra notes 204-31 and accompanying
text.
198. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
199. See id.; see also Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, BPOE, 854 P.2d
513, 516-17 (Utah 1993).
200. See infra notes 204-31 and accompanying text.
201. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
202. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. 1972). But see Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595-96 (1983) (noting that the government
cannot justify allowing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to private schools that practice racial discrimination).
203. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1972).
from clubs which discriminate in their membership practices on the
basis of race or gender.2"
A state may constitutionally refuse to issue or reissue a liquor license
to a club that discriminates in its membership practices, because the
grant of such a license involves the unique power of the state under the
Twenty-First Amendment to regulate liquor use.2"5 A Maryland court
has held that a city ordinance may condition the grant or renewal of a
liquor license to a private club upon proof that the club does not dis-
criminate in its membership policies on the basis of race, gender, reli-
gion, physical handicap, or national origin. 6 In upholding the munici-
204. See Elks Lodges Nos. 719 & 2021 v. Utah Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1200 (Utah 1995); see also 235 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/6-17
(West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1301-A (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 46-10-13.1 (Michie 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32A-5-102(3)(a), -102(3)(b), -
103(7), -105(2)(c) (1994). In Elks Lodges Nos. 719 & 2021, the court held that by
entering the public sphere and stream of commerce, members of Elk and Moose
Lodges, who had applied for and were granted liquor licenses, voluntarily surrendered
the rights they would have had in their private lives to discriminate. See Elks Lodges
Nos. 719 & 2021, 905 P.2d at 1200. By agreeing to become licensees of the Depart-
ment of Alcohol Beverage Control, the members became subject to the Utah Civil
Rights Act. See id. A recently enacted statute in Connecticut bans country clubs from
denying membership to applicants on the basis of gender, race, religion, national
origin, marital status, or sexual orientation and would allow courts to revoke liquor
licenses held by country clubs that make women wait behind men to tee off. Civ.
RTs. NEWSL., May 26, 1997. In February, 1997, the New Jersey Senate passed a bill
that requires all private clubs to "eradicate any benefits for men that are not also
given to women." See Civ. RTs. NEWSL, June 16, 1997. The bill pertains to "all private
clubs that also open their doors for public functions, such as weddings" and authoriz-
es the state to withhold liquor licenses from clubs that discriminate. See id. The bill
was initiated when the president of a New Jersey country club told a woman mem-
ber that she would not be able to play golf, even if she paid a full membership. See
id.
205. See BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607, 608-16, 619-20 (Me. 1972)
(holding that the Maine Liquor Commission was within its lawful authority in denying
renewal of liquor licenses to fifteen Elks Lodges under a state statute prohibiting
private clubs from withholding membership on the basis of race); see also
Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 516 N.E.2d
1153, 1154-55 (Mass. 1987) (upholding the revocation of a liquor license where a
night club deliberately discriminated against African Americans seeking entrance in
violation of a state antidiscrimination statute); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge No.
1743, BPOE, 854 P.2d 513, 514-19 (Utah 1993) (holding that the Elks Lodge's sale of
alcoholic beverages qualified it as an "enterprise regulated by the state" and subjected
it to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act).
206. See Coalition For Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, BPOE, 635 K2d
412, 413 (Md. 1994). The city ordinance provided that "'[an establishment licensed
under the [various club class] provisions ... shall not exclude from membership
solely on the basis of race, sex, religion, physical handicap or national origin in its
membership.'" Id. at 413-14 (alteration in original) (quoting ANNAPOLIS, MD., CODE
§ 7.12.430(A)(1) (1986, Cum. Supp. No. 11, 1993)). "Under the ordinance, any new or
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pal ordinance, the court further held that even though private clubs are
exempt from the antidiscrimination provisions of the state's public ac-
commodations statute,"' that exemption was never intended to be an
"affirmative authorization to discriminate. "2 States can make that point
very clear and can go far to discourage discrimination, even in clubs that
are distinctly private, by requiring an affirmative showing that they are
open to all otherwise protected classifications of persons as a prerequi-
site to obtaining a liquor license.
2. Tax Exemptions
Private clubs receive public tax breaks through their federal nonprofit
status, which exempts them from paying federal income tax. 9 The fed-
eral government may constitutionally provide significant tax exemptions
to nonprofit clubs which blatantly discriminate against minorities and
women, provided the clubs are distinctly private.21 ° In addition, private
renewal alcoholic beverage license application for a private club must 'be accompa-
nied by an affidavit declaring that the establishment for which the license is sought
is not required by any organizational by-laws to engage in any [discriminatory] prac-
tice.'" Id. at 414 (alteration in original) (quoting ANNAPOLIS, MD., CODE
§ 7.12.430(A)(1)).
207. See id. at 421. The Maryland public accommodations law is similar to Title HI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and contains a specific exemption for private clubs,
providing in part that the public accommodations law "'shall not apply to a private
club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that
the facilities of such establishments are made available to the customers or patrons
of an establishment within the scope of this section.'" Id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, § 5(e) (1957)).
208. See id. at 423.
209. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (1994) (exempting nonprofit clubs organized for recre-
ation or pleasure from paying income taxes); I.R.C. § 501(c)(8)-(10) (1994) (exempting
both fraternal orders operating under a lodge system and beneficial societies and
associations).
210. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-58 (D.D.C. 1972). The tax-
exempt status for nonprofit clubs under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(7) is consti-
tutionally sound even when those clubs discriminate on the basis of race, because
the criteria for the exemption does not have the effect of putting a stamp of gov-
ernment approval on the club's discriminatory practices. See id. On the other hand,
the court held that the criteria for tax exempt status under Internal Revenue Code
§ 501(c)(8) for fraternal orders would demonstrate an approval of the discriminatory
practices of such entities if they did discriminate, thereby making that exemption
unconstitutional. See id. at 459.
clubs receive state tax benefits because they are often exempt from the
state franchise tax paid on income.2 '
The benefits to private clubs, and the detriment to the state, resulting
from state tax exemptions, can be substantial. It is estimated that in the
State of Texas alone, country clubs and yacht clubs save approximately
$1.1 million per year by not paying franchise taxes."' Some clubs in
Dallas report annual income of more than $5 million on Internal Revenue
Service forms; these clubs would have paid about $1.7 million each in
federal income tax per year if not for their tax-exempt status."3
Tax exemptions for such private clubs have been questioned. One state
representative, who unsuccessfully sought to end the state tax exemption
in 1977, stated that "[niot unlike vampires, the exemptions allow [private
clubs] to suck the financial resources which normally would go, for in-
stance, toward public education.""4 The image problem of giving tax-
exempt status to private clubs is exacerbated when they remain segregat-
ed despite their assertions that they will admit any qualified appli-
cant.
215
In the past, individual taxpayers were also able to take deductions for
club dues, luncheons, and expenses.2 6 Although the argument may be
moot because the Internal Revenue Code no longer allows deductions for
any "amounts paid or incurred for membership in any club organized for
business, pleasure, recreation, or other social purposes,"21 7 these histor-
ical tax deductions indicate that there are very few distinctly private
clubs. One commentator noted that "[t]he clearest evidence of business
activity at private clubs is the federal and state income tax deductions
taken by members" and that employers reimburse club dues and expens-
es.2"' If private clubs have a limited constitutional right to discriminate
because of a right to associate with whom they choose, they should have
to surrender their tax-exempt status. Other taxpayers, most of whom
211. See Everbach & Wrolstad, supra note 1, at 1Ai
212. See id. (citing Andy Welch, spokesman for the Texas Comptroller's Office).
213. See id.
214. Id. (quoting Texas State Rep. Ron Wilson, Houston).
215. See id.
216. In 1986, Congress limited all valid business-related entertainment and meal ex-
pense deductions to fifty percent of the amount paid. See SANFORD M. GUERIN &
PHILIP F. PROSTLEWArrE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIAL IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 507-08,
524-25 (4th ed. 1994); see also I.R.C. § 274(n) (1994). The deductibility of club dues
under an individual's business expense account, however, was completely eliminated
as of 1993. See GUERIN & PROSTLEWAITE, supra, at 513; see also I.R.C. § 274(a)(3)
(1994).
217. See I.R.C. § 274(a)(3).
218. See Parker, supra note 23, at 51.
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would never condone discrimination, should not be required to support
such clubs.
Many states have eliminated tax exemptions for clubs that discrimi-
nate. In Minnesota, clubs with five or more acres of "open space" that
discriminate on the basis of gender are denied property tax deferments
and exemptions.2"9 California allows no deduction for a taxpayer's "ex-
penditures made at, or payments made to, a club which restricts mem-
bership or the use of its services or facilities on the basis of age, sex,
race, religion, color, ancestry, or national origin."220 Although
Kentucky's public accommodations law22" ' contains a private club ex-
emption modeled after the exemption found in Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,222 the Kentucky Revenue Code prohibits personal income
tax deductions by taxpayers of any amount:
paid to any club, organization, or establishment which has been determined by the
courts or an agency... charged with enforcing the civil rights laws.., not to
afford full and equal membership and full and equal enjoyment of its goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to any person because
of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.m
The foregoing Kentucky provision has faced two obstacles in functioning
as an effective means of eradicating discrimination by country clubs.
First, one Kentucky court noted that any discrimination investigation pre-
mised on the ability of a club member to deduct club dues appears now
to be moot because the Internal Revenue Code no longer allows deduc-
tions for any amount paid or incurred for membership in any other club
organized for business, pleasure, recreation, or other social purpose.'
219. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.112 (West Supp. 1998).
220. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 24343.2(a) (West 1992). In California, the Unruh Civil
Rights Act also bars businesses from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, an-
cestry, national origin, gender, or disability. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp.
1998). The Act was recently applied to provide a remedy to a woman who had been
denied country club membership. See Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896
P.2d 776, 777 (Cal. 1995). Mary Warfield, a champion female golfer at Peninsula Golf
and Country Club, was awarded her husband's membership to the San Mateo Country
Club in a divorce settlement but was denied admission by the club on the basis of
her gender. See id. at 781-82. The California Supreme Court held that the San Mateo
Country Club was a business establishment subject to the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of the Act. See id. at 793, 798.
221. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130 (Michie 1997).
222. See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying text (discussing the public accommo-
dations exceptions in Title II).
223. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(11)(d) (Michie Supp. 1996).
224. See Louisville Country Club v. Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights, Civ. No.
In addition, the same court questioned whether any agency within the
commonwealth has the authority to determine which clubs discriminate
because private clubs are exempt from enforcement under Kentucky's
civil rights laws."5
In addition to the recent revisions of the federal tax laws reducing the
number of deductions allowed by individual taxpayers226 and the possi-
ble jurisdictional issues posed by perceived conflicts between the private
club exemption and tax provisions,227 administrative difficulties plague
state tax deductions and exemptions as a tool for chipping away at dis-
crimination at private clubs. In 1991, Kentucky's Commissioner of the
Revenue Cabinet's Department of Tax Compliance reported that a newly-
enacted state provision disallowing deductions for individual members
who belong to discriminatory clubs would be cumbersome to
enforce.228 Once a discriminatory club was identified, the Revenue Cabi-
net would alert accountants and "conduct audits to determine which tax-
payers had illegally deducted expenses from that club."' The process
could take a year to attend to a single taxpayer."' 8
Despite the cumbersome administration of disallowing tax exemptions
and deductions as a result of discrimination at private clubs, this device
is attractive from moral, social, and political standpoints. As one state
representative who successfully fought for a revision of state tax laws in
Kentucky stated, "[w]e can't force people to change who they associate
with, but they should not enjoy any government benefit at all if they
choose to discriminate."
231
C. Professional Ethics and State Licensure: Leading the Way.
Another effective means of eradicating discrimination in private clubs
is the use of professional organizations' codes of ethics or conduct. Be-
cause the members of such organizations often hold prestigious and in-
fluential positions and are bound by strict codes of conduct or licensure,
95-48 (E.D. Ky. May 13, 1997).
225. See id. (granting summary judgment to three country clubs and holding that
the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights has no authority to investigate a "private
club" in order to determine whether it is engaged in discriminatory membership prac-
tices which are subsidized by the Kentucky Revenue Code).
226. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's limitation on
and elimination of certain deductions).
227. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the authority to deter-
mine discrimination).
228. See Holly Holland, Complaints Use New Law to Probe Private Clubs, COURIER-
J. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 19, 1991, at 1A.
229. See id. (citing the counissioner of Kentucky's Revenue Cabinet).
230. See id.
231. Id. (quoting Kentucky State Rep. Ann Northup).
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professional organizations are in a unique position to change the way
some clubs select their members.
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which is applicable to federal
judges, exemplifies the notion that justice cannot tolerate discrimina-
tion. 2 The Model code prohibits a federal judge from being a member
of any discriminatory organization because "invidious discrimination
gives rise to perceptions that the judge's impartiality is impaired."'m Un-
der the Model Code, an organization "discriminate[s] invidiously if it arbi-
trarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex or
national origin persons who would otherwise be admitted to member-
ship." ' 4 Whether a candidate for a federal judgeship is a member of a
private club with any history of discrimination is an important question
because such membership could potentially imperil a candidate's con-
firmation. 5 The Model Code states further that whether a club discrim-
inates cannot always be determined by examining the club's membership
rolls; thus, the question is a complex one "to which judges should be
sensitive." 6 To preserve the judiciary's important role of maintaining
justice and impartiality, the Model Code should be broadly construed.
Accordingly, judges should avoid even the appearance of impropriety,
such as avoiding the use of a discriminatory club's facilities or receiving
the benefits of club membership through a spouse.237 Furthermore,
many states have adopted similar standards for candidates seeking judi-
cial office and enforce the same high standards of maintaining the ap-
pearance of impartiality.'
232. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-5 (1990).
233. Id. Canon 2(C) commentary.
234. Id.; see also Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 949, 979-84 (1996) (discussing the Code's statements relating to the
impropriety of a judge's membership in clubs that invidiously discriminate).
235. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990). In 1990, The American
Bar Association added the following language to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct: "A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invid-
ious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin." Id. Canon
2(C).
236. Id. Canon 2(C) commentary.
237. See id. Canon 2(B) (providing that a judge should not allow his family or
other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment).
238. See Abramson, supra note 234, at n.3 ("As of early 1996, the following juris-
dictions have adopted all or part of the 1990 Model Code: United States Judicial Con-
ference, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Lawyers comprise another group that could be instrumental in eradi-
cating discrimination at private clubs. Many lawyers are influential lead-
ers in their respective communities. Additionally, they are subject to
regulation through licensure and are bound by a strict code of ethics.2'
Most importantly, lawyers are officers of the court and are bound to
uphold the law.240 Before joining a club or organization, a lawyer
should question whether the club or organization is distinctly private or
illegally discriminates in its membership policies or practices."4
Although judges and lawyers are officers of the court and are in a
prime position to eradicate discrimination at private clubs, other profes-
sionals are also heavily regulated by the state and may also serve as an
impetus for positive change at private clubs. Similar to the grant of a
liquor license, a state may condition the grant of a professional license
upon refraining from illegal, discriminatory activities. 2" For example,
Kentucky real estate agents, licensed and regulated under state law, may
be subject to disciplinary action for unlawful discriminatory activity.'
Because many ostensibly private clubs which maintain elaborate golf
courses and other sports facilities are interested in the publicity and
prestige gained by hosting professional tournaments, professional and in-
tercollegiate sports associations are also in a unique position to eradicate
discrimination. The Professional Golfers' Association has been a leader in
opening the doors for minority membership and equal benefits for wom-
en at private clubs. After one country club founder said that blacks were
not admitted to his club, the Association pledged that clubs hosting its
event must be "demonstrably open."2 Since 1995, clubs desiring to
host or keep tournaments must accept minority members.245 The United
States Golf Association has adopted a similar policy." Public schools
which utilize the facilities of private clubs for sporting activities and
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.").
239. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995).
240. See id. Rule 3.30.
241. See TiUman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431.(1973) (finding a
community pool was not private but did discriminate in its membership policies).
242. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
243. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.160(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (providing that
"[a]ny conduct constituting an act of discrimination regarding a person's race, color,
creed, sex, or national origin ... shall be considered improper conduct"); see also
Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, A Real Estate Professional's and Attorney's Guide to the Fair
Housing Law's Recent Inclusion of Familial Status as a Protected Class, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1143, 1144 & n.3 (1995).
244. See supra note 14 (discussing the efforts of the PGA).
245. See supra note 14 (discussing the efforts of the PGA).
246. See supra note 14 (discussing the efforts of the USGA).
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practices should also be mindful of whether such clubs discriminate
against minorities or women, because such schools are obligated to as-
sure equal opportunities to women in education under Title IX.
247
D. Political Pressure: Skeletons in the Closet.
The electorate is in a position to stand up against discrimination by
scrutinizing those who seek public office. Today, the electorate may
question whether it is appropriate for United States Senators or local
officials and representatives to be members of exclusive all-white clubs.
Any candidate seeking political office should consider exclusive private
club membership as a possible skeleton in the closet."8
E. Changing from Within: Combatting Discrimination Through Club
Channels.
Perhaps the most effective means to combat discrimination by private
clubs is through the use of club channels."4 Many private club mem-
bers have the influence, money, and power to serve as the impetus for
change by speaking out against discriminatory practices. Through effec-
tive club leadership, color-, religion-, and gender-blind-membership pol-
icies and benefits may be implemented. If the members express the idea
that discrimination is not appropriate, there is collective pressure on the
club to change. Thus, club members can take effective actions to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices by private clubs simply by asking ques-
247. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing the guaranty of equal
opportunity in education provided by Title IX of the Education Amendments).
248. In the 1996 United States Senatorial race in Kentucky, the Republican and
Democratic candidates disparaged one another for membership in exclusive all-white
clubs. See All-White Club Also in McConnell Past, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 9, 1996,
at B3. Likewise, in Georgia, Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Max Cleland attacked
his opponent; who had resigned from a racially exclusive country club, stating, "We
don't need leaders who belong to private clubs that exclude over half of Georgia."
See Mark Sherman, '96 Senate Debate Gets Ugly, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 20, 1996,
at G1.
249. In responding to reporters as to the cumbersome administrative problems
posed by new legislation disallowing tax deductions, Kentucky Senator David Karem
remarked, "truth be told, the only way to change (discrimination) [sic] is that the
members have to have a modification of their mindsets. Because no matter how
many laws we pass in the legislature, people will find 100 ways to say they've com-
plied-or go around it." See Holland, supra note 228, at 1A.
tions.2" Many clubs subsidize their facilities and activities by opening
their doors to members and their guests for business luncheons, meet-
ings, and other events for a fee. Club members, as well as their guests,
can check their company's or employer's policies and practices regarding
private clubs and inquire as to the following: (1) whether the company or
employer holds meetings or events at clubs that discriminate, or offers
memberships in discriminatory clubs to executives or other employees;
and (2) whether the company or employer holds fundraising events at
private clubs that discriminate. If so, club members should insist that
their company or employer adopt a policy against such practices.2"'
CONCLUSION
At a time when hate crimes are on the rise, churches with predomi-
nantly black congregations are burned,252 and women and minorities
are attempting to break the glass ceiling by reaching the higher echelons
of the business world,2" discrimination in private clubs may not seem
250. See Sawyer, supra note 21, at 210-11.
251. See id. Author Thomas Sawyer has suggested that club members scrutinize
whether their club is "'truly private' and can pass the private club exemption test" by
asking:
[D]oes the club . . .
have an admission procedure that is genuinely selective?
have formal membership procedures?
have a degree of control over its governance?
make a profit?
have a history of selectivity?
allow nonmembers to use the facilities?
have substantial dues?
advertise for members?
have a statement of purpose that is consistent with its actions?
have formalities?
operate a food stand that is open to nonmembers and interstate travelers?
have annual tournaments that involve nonmembers from other states?
allow visiting athletic teams to play on its course?
link membership benefits to residency in a narrow geographical area?
reject a significant number of applicants for membership?
purchase equipment or food products from another state?
have a liquor license?
allow the furtherance of business opportunities for members?
have a lower tax rate?
Id. at 210-11.
252. See Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime Into Focus-The Hate Crime
Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 261-67
(1991) (discussing the history of the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 and specific
examples of recent hate crimes which prompted Congress to enact new legislation).
253. See Diane E. Lewis, No Break in Glass Ceiling Found, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16,
1995, at 39. It appears that women and minorities still need a great deal of help and
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like the most pressing issue. However, it is an important issue. It is ob-
vious that racially motivated assaults, batteries, murders, and arsons,
committed by a few individuals, are all illegal. On the other hand, dis-
crimination by respectable members at some private clubs is not so ob-
vious. Perhaps it is even more harmful to the excluded individuals and
society as a whole because it is entirely legal, no matter how blatant.
Moreover, for many years, society has looked the other way when clubs
discriminate and, in fact, we have all supported such discrimination
through tax exemptions and other government benefits. The issue has
been characterized as one of simple courtesy and respect.2"
For many years, the focus of the issue of discrimination by private
clubs was upon both judicial construction of the definition of public
accommodation and the private club exemption, including a thorough
development of the factors to be weighed in determining whether a par-
ticular club qualifies as private.255 Despite the passage of thirty years,
the most blatant form of discrimination still exists at some of the most
prestigious country clubs around the country. It is time to take a fresh
look at the private club exemption and construe it most narrowly in light
of the limited purposes of the First Amendment freedoms of association.
At the very least, state and local governments should not subsidize pri-
vate clubs that discriminate by providing tax exemptions and other gov-
ernment benefits ultimately funded by society as a whole. However, soci-
ety cannot rely simply upon the judiciary and the legislature to fight the
battle against blatant discrimination in some private clubs. The most
effective means of eliminating discrimination will come from those who
insist that their organizations adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory poli-
cies and elect representatives who will not take the battle against dis-
crimination lightly.
networking opportunities in breaking that glass ceiling. See id. In 1995, U.S. Labor
Secretary and Chair of the bipartisan Glass Ceiling Commission, Robert Reich, report-
ed that the majority of senior managers of Industrial Fortune 1000 and Fortune 500
companies are predominantly white males. See id. Findings revealed that "[o]nly [five]
percent of all Fortune 2000 industrial and service company managers are women and
virtually all are white." See id.
254. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 108. Professional golfer Emily Lawson stated
that "at its heart, the issue is not about voting rights, all-men's grills or tee
times . . . It's about common courtesy . . . And about respect." See id.
255. See supra notes 122-78 and accompanying text (discussing factors applied by
courts in determining whether a club is private).

